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Abstract
In this paper we discuss a class of mean field linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) games for
large population system which has never been addressed by existing literature. The features
of our works are sketched as follows. First of all, our state is modeled by stochastic Volterra-
type equation which leads to some new study on stochastic “integral” system. This feature
makes our setup significantly different from the previous mean field games where the states
always follow some stochastic “differential” equations. Actually, our stochastic integral sys-
tem is rather general and can be viewed as natural generalization of stochastic differential
equations. In addition, it also includes some types of stochastic delayed systems as its special
cases. Second, some new techniques are explored to tackle our mean-field LQG games due
to the special structure of integral system. For example, unlike the Riccati equation in linear
controlled differential system, some Fredholm-type equations are introduced to characterize
the consistency condition of our integral system via the resolvent kernels. Third, based on
the state aggregation technique, the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation is derived
and the set of associated decentralized controls are verified to satisfy the ǫ-Nash equilibrium
property. To this end, some new estimates of stochastic Volterra equations are developed
which also have their own interests.
Keywords: ǫ-Nash Equilibrium, Fredholm Equation, Mean Field LQG Games, Stochas-
tic Integral System, Stochastic Volterra Equation.
1 Introduction
The large-population systems have important applications in various fields including, but not
limited to, social science [12], financial management, economics [15], [26], industry engineering
(e.g., multi-agent systems [17], [24], coupled oscillators [27], wireless communication [9]), etc.
The most significant feature of large population system lies in the existence of considerable
negligible agents or players involved in their individual states or (and) cost functionals through
the state average across the whole population. Due to such high complexity in dynamics mod-
eling, it is intractable to study the “centralized” control strategy since it strongly requires the
congregation of global information throughout all individual agents. In many cases, such infor-
mation congregation procedure turns out to be impossible yet unnecessary due to the complex
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interaction of all agents. Alternatively, it will be more reasonable to study the “decentralized”
decision strategies of our controlled large population systems for sake of complexity deduction
and computation efficiency.
Recently, there has been increasing research interest in studying this type of stochastic
control problems as well as addressing their applications. In particular, the research in this
area has been well developed for the decentralized control of large population system during
the last few decades. Among them, one efficient methodology is to consider the related mean-
field game by transforming the large-population or multi-agent optimization into one single-
agent optimization. Concerning to this methodology, for each given agent, only decentralized
information of its own state is required to design the control policy while the effects of remaining
agents are summarized by some mean-field term to be determined by the consistency condition.
As a consequence, each agent aims to solve some Hamiltonian-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
which is coupled with the Fokker-Planck (FP) equation of controlled large population system.
By the coupling of FP equation, the population or global effects are combined thus each agent
only needs to derive the feedback strategy involving its own state. In case of the linear controlled
system, it leads to some LQG mean-field games where the Riccati equations are coupled with
the FP equation of our system. Some relevant literature of LQG mean-field game include [2], [8],
[10], [11], [16], [20] and the reference therein. In rough sense, its general setup can be presented
as follows. There exist a collection of large number negligible players where individual state
follows linear stochastic differential equations
dxi(t) =
[
Aixi(t) +Biui(t) + Fix
(N)(t)
]
dt+DidWi(t), (1)
where x(N) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi denotes the state average or mean field term. It characterizes the global
effects of all agents in our population. The cost functional to be minimized takes the following
form:
Ji(ui(·)) = 1
2
E
{∫ T
0
[
Q(xi(t)− x(N)(t))2 +Ru2i (t)
]
dt+Hx2i (T )
}
.
The scheme of mean-field LQG game is formulated into some limiting LQG problem which can
be solved using the own individual state without the complicated interactions of all agents.
Based on it, by reproducing the best response of the state, the decentralized control policy can
be derived and some Nash equilibrium property in near-optimal sense should be verified. Last,
we would like to mention some other works on mean-field (McKean-Vlasov) SDEs (MFSDEs):
for example, see [1] [3] for stochastic mean-field control and related maximum principles, [4]
for the large deviation principle (LDP) of weakly coupled MFSDEs, and [19] for the stochastic
control of MFSDEs using the Malliavian calculus and its applications to mean-variance problem.
Based on above works, herein we turn to study the large population system with stochastic
“integral” instead of “differential” dynamics. Accordingly, new methodologies are required to be
developed, which are significantly different from those in the standard stochastic control theory
in the literature, to cope with the mathematical difficulties involved in this mean-field LQG. Our
motivation to mean-field LQG integral games are mainly as follows. First, it is remarkable there
exists many stochastic or deterministic models arising from physical, economics and finance
which cannot be represented by differential systems, see for example, stochastic input-output
model [5], capital replacement model [13], models in nanoscale biophysics [14]. Therefore, in
terms of stochastic integral system, it is more appropriate to study the mean-field LQG integral
game emerged naturally in the mass behavior of large population. Second, our integral system
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includes some cases of stochastic delay in state or control variable which play important roles
in biology, social science and engineering. One example is advertising model for which there are
some delay effects ([6], [7]). When we consider the interactions effects of all small advertising
firms through the whole industry, it is necessary to formulate some mean-field integral games.
Another example is the dynamic optimization of large population wireless interaction knots
where there exist some delay effects in signal transmission thus some large population stochastic
delayed games should be formulated.
Motivated by above concerns, in this paper, we consider the following controlled stochastic
Volterra integral equations
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
f(t, s)xN (s)ds
+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s). (2)
where xN = 1
N
∑N
j=1 xj is the mean field term which characterizes average interaction and
mass effects of our population in spatial variable, ϕ, b, c, σ are deterministic functions, called the
kernels, which characterize path dependence of out state in its temporal variable. Compared
with mean field LQG games in [2], [8]-[12], [20], there are several new features or obstacles arising
in such general framework. The first one is concerned on the expression of optimal control where
the skills of Riccati equations are no long useful. By means of series skills, resolvent kernel, and
backward stochastic Volterra integral equations (BSVIEs for short), we obtain optimal control
ûi(t) where the path dependence on state xi in [t, T ] is shown explicitly. As to BSVIEs, we refer
the readers to [23], [25], [28], [29]. Secondly, the equation satisfied by optimal state is no long
a linear SDEs but a new kind of equation with double integrals. We call it stochastic Volterra-
Fredholm equation, the solvability of which is discussed under certain conditions. Thirdly, in
the procedure of deriving NCE equation, certain Fredholm integral equations work well while
Riccati equation becomes unapplicable again. Such result is consistent with the arguments in
[22] where Riccati equation is replaced by Fredholm integral equation to express result more
clearly. Fourthly, in order to discuss asymptotic equilibrium analysis of decentralized control,
some nontrivial extension of classical results are needed, and new tricks in doing these are
developed. In addition, the optimal control, optimal state and NCE equation are derived in a
new manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the mean field LQG game for
stochastic integral system is formulated. Section 3 is devoted to the discussion of the NCE equa-
tion and the consistency condition. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of decentralized strategy
is also discussed therein. In Section 4, some special cases are discussed. Section 5 concludes our
work.
2 Problem formulation
In this paper, we set the state equation to be one-dimensional for sake of notation simplicity.
There has no essential difficulty to extend the results to the multi-dimensional case. Suppose
(Ω,F , (Ft)0≤t≤T ,P) is a complete filtered probability space on which W (t) = (Wi(t))0≤t≤T ,
1 ≤ i ≤ N are independent scalar-valued Brownian motions. It is also assumed (Ft)0≤t≤T is
the natural filtration generated by W (t) and F = FT . We also need to introduce the following
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spaces.
L2(0, T ;R) =
{
x : [0, T ]→ R
∣∣∣ x(·) is deterministic such that ∫ T
0
|x(s)|2ds <∞
}
,
L2F (0, T ;R) =
{
x : [0, T ]× Ω→ R
∣∣∣ x(·) is Ft-adapted process such that E ∫ T
0
|x(s)|2ds <∞
}
,
C(0, T ;R) =
{
x : [0, T ]→ R
∣∣∣ x(·) is deterministic and continuous on [0, T ]}.
Now consider the stochastic large population integral system which consists of N individual
negligible players, denote respectively by Ai, i = 1, 2, · · · , N . The dynamics of Ai is given by
the following stochastic Volterra equation
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
f(t, s)xN (s)ds
+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s). (3)
All individual players are coupled in terms of their individual cost functional as follows:
Ji(ui, u−i) = E
∫ T
0
[
(xi(t)− γxN (t)− η)2 +Ru2i (t)
]
dt, (4)
where u−i = (u1, · · · , ui−1, ui+1, · · · , uN ), and R > 0, γ, η are constants. Some special cases of
our general state equations are as follows.
The first one is the differential case, i.e., the kernels ϕ, b, c, σ are independent of t. In this
case, equation (3) becomes the following stochastic integral equation,
xi(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
b(s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
c(s)ui(s)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(s)dWi(s). (5)
Note that all the previous mentioned literature of large population LQG games are based on
equation (5). The second case is the stochastic differential equation with delay in state which
can be described as
dxi(t) =
[
A(t)xi(t− h) +
∫ t
t−h
B(t, s)xi(s)ds
]
dt+ C(t)ui(t)dt+D(t)dWi(t), (6)
where h > 0 is the delay or lag parameter, xi(t) = k(t), t ∈ [−h, 0]. The third one includes
stochastic differential equations with delay in control variable which evolves as
dxi(t) = A(t)xi(t)dt+ C(t)ui(t− h)dt +D(t)dWi(t), (7)
where h > 0, xi(t) = k(t), t ∈ [−h, 0]. Under certain conditions, we can transform equation (6)
and (7) into the following form of stochastic Volterra integral equation,
xi(t) = ψ(t) +
∫ t
0
K(t, s)ui(s)ds +
∫ t
0
Φ(t, s)D(s)dWi(s).
We refer to Section 4 for more details on these procedures.
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3 NCE equation system and asymptotic equilibrium analysis
Given the state dynamics (3) and cost functional (4), this section aims to derive the associ-
ated Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation. To this end, some decentralized asymptotic
equilibrium analysis should be given.
3.1 NCE equation
First, let us formulate one auxiliary limiting control problem via the approximation of state
average xN by some deterministic function a(t). Now we introduce the following state equation
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
f(t, s)a(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s), t ∈ [0, T ], (8)
and the cost functional for player Ai (i = 1, 2, · · · , N),
J i(ui) = E
∫ T
0
[
(xi(t)− γa(t)− η)2 +R|ui(t)|2
]
dt. (9)
In this case, it follows from [23] or [29] that the optimal control ui can be represented by
ui(t) = − 1
2R
E
Ft
∫ T
t
c(s, t)yi(s)ds (10)
where yi satisfies the following linear Backward Stochastic Volterra Integral Equation (BSVIE)
yi(t) = 2xi(t)− 2γa(t) − 2η +
∫ T
t
b(s, t)yi(s)ds −
∫ T
t
zi(t, s)dWi(s), (11)
and xi is the solution of (8) with respect to ui. Due to the special form of (11), by using Lemma
1.1 in [22] we can formulate yi as
yi(t) = 2xi(t)− 2γa(t) − 2η +
∫ T
t
2P (s, t)[xi(s)− γa(s)− η]ds, (12)
where for any 0 ≤ t ≤ s ≤ T,
P (s, t) =
∞∑
k=1
Λk(s, t), Λ1(s, t) = b(s, t), Λk+1(s, t) =
∫ s
t
b(s, r)Λk(r, t)dr. (13)
Remark 3.1 Note that (12) can be viewed as a constant variation formula in our setup and
P is called “resolvent kernel”. In the special multi-dimensional differential case, P becomes the
solution of fundamental matrix. The method of infinite series will be frequently adopted in our
following analysis. On the other hand, it is straightforward to verify
|Λk(s, t)| < M
k|t− s|k−1
(k − 1)! , t, s ∈ [0, T ], k ≥ 1,
where M is the upper bound of b, thus P is bounded. Moreover, if b is continuous in t, then one
can see that P is also continuous in t.
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Substituting (12) into (10), we can rewrite the optimal control in (10) as
ui(t) = − 1
R
E
Ft
∫ T
t
ĉ(s, t)[xi(s)− γa(s)− η]ds, (14)
where
ĉ(s, t) = c(s, t) +
∫ s
t
P (s, r)c(r, t)dr, s ≥ t. (15)
Note that if b, c are continuous in t, by using Remark 3.1 one can see that ĉ(t, s) is also continuous
in t. On the other hand, by using Lemma 1.1. of [22], we can rewrite (8) as
xi(t) = ϕ̂(t) + σ̂i(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)a(s)ds +
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)ui(s)ds, (16)
where P is defined in (13) and
ϕ̂(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
P (t, s)ϕ(s)ds,
σ̂i(t) =
∫ t
0
[
σ(t, s) +
∫ t
s
P (t, r)σ(r, s)dr
]
dWi(s),
f̂(t, s) = f(t, s) +
∫ t
s
P (t, r)f(r, s)dr. (17)
Consequently, by combining (14) and (16), as well as stochastic Fubini theorem, the optimal
state equation of this limit control problem can be described by
xi(t) = ϕ̂(t) + σ̂i(t)− 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)EFrxi(s)drds
+
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)a(s)ds +
1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)dr · [γa(s) + η]ds. (18)
In particular, by taking expectation,
Exi(t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)a(s)ds +
1
R
∫ T
0
M(t, s)[γa(s) + η − Exi(s)]ds, (19)
where
M(t, s) =
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)dr, t, s ∈ [0, T ]. (20)
Given a(s), (19) can be regarded as a Fredholm integral equation with solution being Exi(·).
Before analyzing, we present one result on the solvability of Fredholm integral equation which
is easy to check.
Lemma 3.1 Consider the following Fredholm integral equation
x(t) = ψ(t) +
1
R
∫ T
0
A(t, s)x(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (21)
where ψ, A are bounded and continuous functions in t. If
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
|A(t, s)|2ds < R, sup
t∈[0,T ]
|ψ(t)|2 <∞,
then there exists a unique continuous solution x(·) of (21).
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From Lemma 3.1, we can get the following result directly.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose ϕ, b, f , c are bounded and continuous in t such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
|M(t, s)|2ds < R.
Then, given a ∈ C[0, T ], there exists a unique continuous function Exi(·) satisfying equation
(19).
Given a(s), using Theorem 3.1, we can define Γa by
[Γa](t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)a(s)ds +
1
R
∫ T
0
M(t, s)
{
γa(s) + η − [Γa](s)}ds. (22)
The Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation in our setting is thus
â(t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)â(s)ds +
1
R
∫ T
0
M(t, s)[(γ − 1)â(s) + η]ds, (23)
where â is the corresponding solution. Note that (23) is a linear deterministic Volterra-Fredholm
integral equation. Before going further, similar to (16) above, we transform (23) into a Fredholm
integral equation. More precisely, by using Lemma 1.1. in [22], we can rewrite (23) as
â(t) = ϕ˜(t) +
1
R
∫ T
0
M˜(t, s)[(γ − 1)â(s) + η]ds, (24)
where
ϕ˜(t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
P˜ (t, s)ϕ̂(s)ds,
M˜ (t, s) =M(t, s) +
∫ t
0
P˜ (t, r)M(r, s)dr, (25)
and
P˜ (t, s) =
∞∑
k=1
Λ˜k(t, s), Λ˜1(t, s) = f̂(t, s), Λ˜k+1(t, s) =
∫ t
s
f̂(t, r)Λ˜k(r, s)dr. (26)
Note that the technique applied here is similar to that in (13). To summarize, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Suppose ϕ, b, c, f are bounded and continuous in t. If
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
∣∣∣(γ − 1)M˜ (t, s)∣∣∣2 ds < R,
then (23) admits a unique solution a ∈ C[0, T ].
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Before concluding this section, let us make some remarks on (14), (18) and (23). Firstly, note
that ui(t) depends on the path of xi in [t, T ]. Moreover, ĉ is a general non-separable function of
(t, s). In particular, such a general feature can naturally degenerate and transform into the form
with Riccati equation involved, see Section 4.1 below. Secondly, equation (18) is a new type of
stochastic equation with double integrals, which is essentially different from the corresponding
equation in stochastic differential equations (SDEs) case. Since it has both the characters of
Volterra and Fredholm equation, we then call it a stochastic Volterra-Fredholm equation. We
will study its solvability under certain conditions in next section by noting our main concern here
is NCE equation. Thirdly, we express the NCE equation in our setting by means of deterministic
Volterra-Fredholm equation. This idea is also different to other literature on SDEs.
3.2 Asymptotic equilibrium analysis
Given the NCE equation, we need to discuss the asymptotic equilibrium property of the asso-
ciated decentralized control strategies. To start, let us first introduce the definition of ǫ-Nash
equilibrium:
Definition 3.1 Given a set of controls ûi ∈ L2F (0, T ;R) with i = 1, 2, · · · , N , if for any i,
1 ≤ i ≤ N, Ji(ûi, û−i) ≤ Ji(ui, û−i) + ǫ, where ǫ > 0, û−i = (û1, · · · , ûi−1, ûi+1, · · · , ûN ),
ui ∈ L2F (0, T ;R), then we call this set of controls ûi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with
respect to costs Ji with 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Suppose â is the solution of NCE equation (23), then we can define the decentralized control ûi
for agent Ai as follows:
ûi(t) = − 1
R
E
Ft
∫ T
t
ĉ(s, t)[xi(s)− γâ(s)− η]ds (27)
where xi is the solution of (3) corresponding to ûi. Note that ûi is different from the above ui
in (14). Substituting (27) into equation (3), together with the transformation in (16), we get
xi(t) = ϕ̂(t) + σ̂i(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)xN (s)ds
−
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)
1
R
E
Fs
∫ T
s
ĉ(r, s)[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]drds, (28)
where ϕ̂, σ̂i and f̂ are defined in (17). On the other hand, by replacing a by â in (18), we get
xi(t) = ϕ̂(t) + σ̂i(t)− 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)EFrxi(s)drds
+
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)â(s)ds+
1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)dr · [γâ(s) + η]ds. (29)
To derive the asymptotic equilibrium, we need first to prove several lemmas. In the following,
we denote by C a generic positive constant independent of N that may change from line to line.
Lemma 3.2 Suppose
x(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
A(t, s)x(s)ds − 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
B(t, r)B(s, r)EFrx(s)drds, (30)
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where ϕ(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R), A,B are deterministic and bounded functions such that
T
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
|B̂(t, r)B(s, r)|2drdsdt < R
2
3
. (31)
Here we denote by
B̂(t, r) = B(t, r) +
∫ t
r
P0(t, v)B(v, r)dv, t, v ∈ [0, T ],
P0(t, v) =
∞∑
k=1
Λk(t, v), Λ1(t, t) = A(t, v), Λk+1(t, v) =
∫ t
v
A(t, r)Λk(r, v)dr. (32)
Then (30) admits a unique solution x(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R) satisfying
E
∫ T
0
|x(s)|2ds ≤ 6E
∫ T
0
|ϕ̂(s)|2ds, (33)
where
ϕ̂(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
P0(t, s)ϕ(s)ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Given y(·) ∈ L2F (0, T ;R), consider the following Volterra equation
x(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
A(t, s)x(s)ds − 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
B(t, r)B(s, r)EFry(s)drds, (34)
which obviously admits a unique solution x(·) under above assumptions. By using Lemma 1.1
in [22], we can rewrite (34) as
x(t) = ϕ̂(t)− 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
B̂(t, r)B(s, r)EFry(s)drds.
Then using the idea of contraction mapping and Lemma 3.1, together with above requirements,
we can obtain the existence of x(·) in L2F (0, T ;R) satisfying (33). ✷
Remark 3.2 Some comment to (30). To be shown later, it plays some key role in our remaining
analysis. Since our first concern here is the solvability of (30) under certain conditions. In
such sense, we do not pursue the most general assumptions here and we hope to weaken these
conditions in our future work.
By comparing (23) and (29), we have
Lemma 3.3 Suppose NCE equation (23) admits a unique solution â(·), and (31), (32) hold
with A = 0, B = ĉ, then
E
∫ T
0
|â(s)− xN (s)|2ds = O
( 1
N
)
, (35)
where xN (t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t) and xi satisfies (29).
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Proof. From (23) and (29), we know the difference between xi and â satisfies the type of
Equation (30) with A = 0, B = ĉ, ϕ = σ̂i. Then by means of (33),
E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt ≤ CE
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
i=1
σ̂i(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
dt.
It then follows from the boundedness of σ and P in (17), together with the independence of Wi
(i = 1, 2, · · · , N) that
E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt = O
(
1
N
)
,
which implies the desired result. ✷
Lemma 3.4 Suppose NCE equation (23) admits a solution â, (31) and (32) hold for two cases
of A = f̂ , B = ĉ, and A = 0, B = ĉ, then
E
∫ T
0
|â(s)− xN (s)|2ds+ sup
1≤i≤N
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− xi(t)|2dt = O
( 1
N
)
(36)
where xN (t) = 1
N
N∑
i=1
xi(t), xi satisfies (28).
Proof. Comparing (28) and (29), we can rewrite xi(t) as
xi(t) = xi(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)
[
xN (s)− â(s)
]
ds
− 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)EFr [xi(s)− xi(s)]drds.
Therefore,
xN (t)− â(t) = xN (t)− â(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)
[
xN (s)− â(s)
]
ds
− 1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)EFr [xN (s)− â(s)]drds
+
1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
ĉ(t, r)ĉ(s, r)EFr [xN (s)− â(s)]drds.
By using Lemma 3.2, Lemma 3.3, together with the boundedness of f̂ and ĉ, we can obtain the
desired result (36). ✷
We also need the following result.
Theorem 3.3 Suppose ϕ, f , b and c are bounded and continuous in t, NCE equation (23)
admits a unique continuous solution â ∈ C[0, T ], ui is the optimal control with state equation
(8), cost functional (9) that is parameterized by â, (31) and (32) hold for two cases of A = f̂ ,
B = ĉ, and A = 0, B = ĉ. Then for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , we have
| Ji(ûi, û−i)− J i(ui) |= O
(
1√
N
)
. (37)
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Proof. First from the definition of Ji in (4) and J i in (9),
Ji(ûi, û−i)− J i(ui) ≤ CE
∫ T
0
∣∣R|ûi(t)|2 −R|ui(t)|2∣∣ dt
+ CE
∫ T
0
∣∣|xi(t)− γxN (t)− η|2 − |xi(t)− γâ(t)− η|2∣∣ dt
≤ CE
∫ T
0
R
[|ûi(t)− ui(t)|2 + 2|ui(t)| · |ûi(t)− ui(t)|] dt
+ CE
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− xi(t)− γ(xN (t)− â(t))|2dt
+ CE
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− γâ(t)− η| · |xi(t)− xi(t)− γ(xN (t)− â(t))|dt,
where xi and xi satisfy (28) and (29) respectively. It follows from (10) and (27) that
E
∫ T
0
|ûi(t)− ui(t)|2dt ≤ 1
R2
E
∫ T
0
E
Ft
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
ĉ(s, t)[xi(s)− xi(s)]ds
∣∣∣∣
2
dt
≤ CE
∫ T
0
|xi(s)− xi(s)|2ds.
Note that equation (29) is one special case of (30) with A = 0, B = ĉ. Under above requirement,
then from inequality (33) above we have the boundedness of xi in L
2
F (0, T ;R). Recalling (14)
with a = â, we can also get similar boundedness result for ui. As a result, by Schwarz’s inequality,
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)||ûi(t)− ui(t)|dt ≤
[
E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt
] 1
2
[
E
∫ T
0
|ûi(t)− ui(t)|2dt
] 1
2
≤ C
[
E
∫ T
0
|xi(s)− xi(s)|2ds
] 1
2
.
On the other hand,
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− xi(t)− γ(xN (t)− â(t))|2dt ≤ CE
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− xi(t)|2dt+ CE
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt.
Similarly, we can use Schwarz’s inequality to estimate
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− γâ(t)− η| · |xi(t)− xi(t)− γ(x(N)(t)− â(t))|dt
≤ C
[
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− xi(t)|2dt
] 1
2
+ C
[
E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt
] 1
2
.
Therefore, by using Lemma 3.4, we obtain the desired result. ✷
In the following part, given two processes ξa, ξb in L
2
F (0, T ;R), we denote by
ǫa =
(
E
∫ T
0
|ξa(t)|2dt
) 1
2
<∞, ǫb =
(
E
∫ T
0
|ξb(t)|2dt
) 1
2
<∞. (38)
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First let us recall the optimal control problem of which optimal control ui and optimal state
equation xi are given by (14) and (18) with a = â. For comparison, we also discuss one perturbed
version with state equation
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)â(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
g(t, s)ξa(s)ds+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s), (39)
and the cost functional
J
ξ
i (ui) = E
∫ T
0
[|xi(t)− γâ(t)− η + ξb(t)|2 +R|ui(t)|2] dt.
Here g is bounded deterministic function. Then we have the following result.
Lemma 3.5 Suppose ui is an optimal control given in (14) and
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|ui(t)|2dt ≤ C0. (40)
where xi, ui are defined in (39), C0 is a fixed constant. Moreover, â is continuous and bounded,
(31) and (32) hold for A = 0, B = ĉ, then we have
J
ξ
i (ui) ≥ J i(ui)− C(1 + ǫb)(ǫa + ǫb).
Proof. For convenience, we can rewrite (39) as
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)â(s)ds+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)u′i(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
g(t, s)ξa(s)ds+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s).
Here u′i(s) = ui(s)− ui(s),
ui(s) = − 1
R
E
Ft
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]dr,
where xi satisfies (39), ĉ is given in (15). It then follows from inequality (40) that E
∫ T
0 |u′i(t)|2dt ≤
C. Next we construct one auxiliary optimal control problem with state equation and cost func-
tional as
x˜i(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)x˜i(s)ds+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)â(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)u′′i (s)ds +
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s, x˜i)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s), (41)
and
J˜i(u
′′
i ) = E
∫ T
0
[|x˜i(t)− γâ(t)− η|2 +R|u′′i (t) + ui(t, x˜i)|2] dt.
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where u′′i is the control variable. For t ∈ [0, T ], ui(t, x˜i) in (41) is defined as
ui(t, x˜i) = − 1
R
E
Ft
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)[x˜i(r)− γâ(r)− η]dr.
Obviously, J˜i(u
′′
i ) attains its minimum when u
′′
i = 0, and the corresponding cost functional
equals to J i(ui). On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2,
M ′i(t) =
∫ t
0
c(t, s)u′i(s)ds +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)M ′i(s)ds −
1
R
∫ t
0
c(t, s)EFt
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)M ′i (r)drds
admits a unique solution M ′i such that
E
∫ T
0
|M ′i(t)|2dt ≤ 6E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
c(t, s)u′i(s)ds
∣∣∣∣
2
dt ≤ C.
If we take u′′i = u
′
i(s) = ui(s) − ui(s), and x˜′i is the corresponding solution of (41), then x˜′i =
xi(t) + M
′
i(t), where xi(t) is the optimal state in (18) with a = â. Moreover, recalling the
boundedness of xi in L
2
F (0, T ;R), we also have E
∫ T
0 |x˜′i(t)|2dt ≤ C. Since xi and x˜′i are given in
(39) and (41), thus their difference di = xi − x˜′i satisfy
di(t) =
∫ t
0
g(t, s)ξa(s)ds +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)di(s)ds − 1
R
∫ t
0
c(t, s)EFt
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)di(r)drds.
Under above requirements, from Lemma 3.2, we have
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)− x˜′i(t)|2dt ≤ 6E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
g(t, s)ξa(s)ds
∣∣∣∣
2
dt ≤ Cǫ2a.
Following the similar arguments in [20], we should have
|Jξi (ui)− J˜i(u′i)| ≤ C(1 + ǫb)(ǫa + ǫb),
where C does not depend on ξa and ξb. After combining the estimate of J˜i(u
′
i) ≥ J i(ui), we can
get the desired result. ✷
The next lemma is concerned about the boundedness of Ji(ûi, û−i).
Lemma 3.6 Suppose â is solution of NCE equation (23), (31) and (32) hold for two cases of
A = f̂ , B = ĉ, and A = 0, B = ĉ. Then Ji(ûi, û−i) ≤ C, where C does not depend on N .
Proof. If we can prove
E
∫ T
0
|ûi(s)|2ds ≤ C, E
∫ T
0
|xi(s)|2ds ≤ C,
where xi satisfies (28), C does not depend on N, then the result holds directly. From (28), we
have
xN (t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)xN (s)ds+
1
N
N∑
l=1
σ̂l(t)
−
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)
1
R
E
Fs
∫ T
s
ĉ(r, s)[xN (r)− γâ(r)− η]drds, (42)
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where xN (t) = 1
N
N∑
l=1
xl(t). Note that (42) is one special case of equation (30), (31) and (32) hold
for A = f̂ , B = ĉ, it then follows from Lemma 3.2 that
E
∫ T
0
|xN (s)|2ds ≤ CE
∫ T
0
|ϕ̂(s)|2ds +CE
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
l=1
σ̂l(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
dt
+ CE
∫ T
0
|â(s)|2ds+ C. (43)
As to xi in equation (28), using (43) and conditions (31), (32) with A = 0, B = ĉ, we should
have E
∫ T
0 |xi(s)|2ds ≤ C where C is independent of N . At last, we know that
E
∫ T
0
|ûi(t)|2dt = 1
R2
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]dr
∣∣∣∣
2
dt
≤ 1
R2
∫ T
0
∫ T
t
|ĉ(r, t)|2drdt · E
∫ T
0
[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]2dr.
Hence E
∫ T
0 |ûi(t)|2dt is bounded, too. Then the desired result holds. ✷
If we apply control ûj in (27) to all the player except Ai, that is, for j 6= i,
xj(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xj(s)ds+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)[xN (s)− â(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)â(s)ds+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ûj(s)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWj(s), (44)
while for player i,
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s) +
∫ t
0
f(t, s)xN (s)ds, (45)
then similar as Lemma 3.4 above, we also have the following result.
Lemma 3.7 Suppose â is the solution of NCE equation (23), (31) and (32) hold for two cases
of A = f̂ , B = ĉ and A = 0, B = ĉ. Moreover, (1 +K2)K1
360
N2R2
L2 < 12 , where
L =
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
|ĉ(t, s)|2dsdt, K1 =
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
|f̂(t, s)|2dsdt, K2 =
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
|P0(t, s)|2dsdt,
P0 is defined in (32) with A = f̂ . Then we have
E
∫ T
0
|â(s)− xN (s)|2ds = O
( 1
N
)
,
where xN (t) = 1
N
∑N
l=1 xl(t), xl satisfies (44) and (45).
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Proof. For convenience, we also rewrite (45) as
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)â(s)ds+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ûi(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s) +
∫ t
0
f(t, s)[xN (s)− â(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
c(t, s)[ui(s)− ûi(s)]ds, (46)
where ûi is defined as
ûi(t) = − 1
R
E
Ft
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]dr, (47)
and xi satisfies (45). After some direct calculations,
xN (t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)â(s)ds +
1
N
N∑
l=1
σ̂l(t)
−
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)
1
R
E
Fs
∫ T
s
ĉ(r, s)[xN (r)− γâ(r)− η]drds
+
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)[xN (s)− â(s)]ds + 1
N
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)[ui(s)− ûi(s)]ds,
where ϕ̂, f̂ , σ̂l are defined in (17). Using Fubini theorem, it also follows from (18) (with a = â)
that
xN (t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)â(s)ds+
1
N
N∑
l=1
σ̂l(t)
−
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)
1
R
E
Fs
∫ T
s
ĉ(r, s)[xN (r)− γâ(r)− η]drds,
therefore we have
xN (t)− â(t) = xN (t)− â(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)[xN (s)− â(s)]ds
−
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)
1
R
E
Fs
∫ T
s
ĉ(r, s)[xN (r)− â(r)]drds
+
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)
1
R
E
Fs
∫ T
s
ĉ(r, s)[xN (r)− â(r)]drds
+
1
N
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)[ui(s)− ûi(s)]ds. (48)
Note that if A = 0, B = ĉ, then (31) and (32) imply xN is bounded in L2F (0, T ;R). Similarly, if
(31) and (32) hold with A = f̂ , B = ĉ, then using Lemma 3.2 to (48), we have
E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt
≤ (1 +K2)
[
(36 + 12R2)E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt+ 36
N2
L · E
∫ T
0
[ui(s)− ûi(s)]2ds
]
, (49)
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where L and K2 are defined before. On the other hand, from Lemma 3.6, Ji(ûi, û−i) is bounded,
it then suffices to consider ui in (45) such that Ji(ui, û−i) ≤ Ji(ûi, û−i), which implies that
E
∫ T
0 |ui(t)|2dt ≤ C. As to ûi in (47), we have
E
∫ T
0
|ûi(t)|2dt = 1
R2
E
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣
∫ T
t
ĉ(r, t)[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]dr
∣∣∣∣
2
dt
≤ 1
R2
L · E
∫ T
0
[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]2dr,
therefore,
E
∫ T
0
[ui(s)− ûi(s)]2ds ≤ 2E
∫ T
0
|ui(s)|2ds+ 2E
∫ T
0
|ûi(s)|2ds
≤ C + 2
R2
L · E
∫ T
0
|xi(r)|2dr, (50)
where C does not depend on N . Substituting (50) into (49), we have
E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt
≤ (1 +K2)(36 + 12R2)E
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt
+
C
N2
+ (1 +K2)
72
N2R2
L2 · E
∫ T
0
[ui(s)− ûi(s)]2ds. (51)
After some transformations, we can rewrite (45) as
xi(t) = ϕ̂(t) +
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)[xN (s)− â(s)]ds
+
∫ t
0
f̂(t, s)â(s)ds+
∫ t
0
ĉ(t, s)ui(s)ds + σ̂i(t),
therefore,
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)|2dt ≤ 5E
∫ T
0
|ϕ̂(t)|2dt+ 5
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
|f̂(t, s)|2dsdt · E
∫ T
0
|xN (s)− â(s)|2ds
+ 5
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
|f̂(t, s)|2dsdt ·
∫ T
0
|â(s)|2ds
+ 5
∫ T
0
∫ t
0
|ĉ(t, s)|2dsdt · E
∫ T
0
|ui(s)|2ds+ E
∫ T
0
|σ̂i(t)|2dt. (52)
Since ϕ̂, f̂ , â, σ are bounded, substituting (51) into (52) yields
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)|2dt ≤ C + CE
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt+ (1 +K2)K1 360
N2R2
L2 · E
∫ T
0
[xi(s)]
2ds.
So if (1 +K2)K1
360
N2R2
L2 < 12 , then we have
E
∫ T
0
|xi(t)|2dt ≤ C + CE
∫ T
0
|xN (t)− â(t)|2dt,
which implies the boundedness of E
∫ T
0 |xi(t)|2dt. By combining (51), (52) and Lemma 3.3, we
obtained the desired result. ✷
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Remark 3.3 Compared with Lemma 3.4 above, our result here seems to be more general because
ui in (45) is not necessary to be ûi in (27). Moreover, our result also generalizes the correspond-
ing result in [20] in that our state equation can degenerate to the linear SDEs there. In addition,
our approach here is also different from the one used in [20]. At last, although the conditions
imposed on above coefficients K1, K2 and L seem to be technical, it has two interesting features.
First, the above inequality holds true in general because N is always sufficiently large. Second,
such condition is not required in the nontrivial case f̂ = 0.
Now let us state the main result in this subsection.
Theorem 3.4 Suppose ϕ, f , b and c are bounded and continuous in t, the NCE equation (23)
admits a unique continuous solution â ∈ C[0, T ]. (31) and (32) hold with A = f̂ , B = ĉ and
A = 0, B = ĉ. Moreover, (1 +K2)K1
360
N2R2
L2 < 12 , where L, K1, K2 are defined in Lemma 3.7.
Then the set of control ûi in (27) with 1 ≤ i ≤ N for N players is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, i.e.,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ,
Ji(ûi, û−i)− ǫ ≤ inf
ui∈L2F [0,T ]
Ji(ui, û−i) ≤ Ji(ûi, û−i).
Proof. If we denote by ξa(t) = x
N (t) − â(t), ξb(t) = γ(â(t) − xN (t)), then the dynamics and
cost functional of Ai can be rewritten as
xi(t) = ϕ(t) +
∫ t
0
b(t, s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
f(t, s)â(s)ds
+
∫ t
0
f(t, s)ξa(s)ds +
∫ t
0
c(t, s)ui(s)ds+
∫ t
0
σ(t, s)dWi(s), (53)
and
Ji(ui) = E
∫ T
0
[|xi(t)− γâ(t)− η + ξb(t)|2 +R|ui(t)|2] dt.
From Lemma 3.7, we have ǫa + ǫb = O(
1√
N
), and E
∫ T
0 |xi(t)|2dt + E
∫ T
0 |ui(t)|2dt ≤ C, where
C is independent of N , ǫa, ǫb are defined in (38), it then follows from Lemma 3.7, Theorem 3.3
that
Ji(ui, û−i) ≥ J i(ui)−O
(
1√
N
)
≥ Ji(ûi, û−i)−O
(
1√
N
)
.
The conclusion is thus proved. ✷
4 Some special cases
In this section, we want to show that our general results can include some special cases that are
important for real applications. For sake of simplicity, we suppose f = 0 in the following.
4.1 The case of stochastic differential equation
In this case, ϕ, b, c, σ are independent of t, and Equation (3) becomes
xi(t) = x(0) +
∫ t
0
b(s)xi(s)ds +
∫ t
0
c(s)ui(s)ds +
∫ t
0
σ(s)dWi(s), (54)
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while the cost functional (4) still keeps the same. Most related literatures on mean field LQG
games are discussed by the above linear SDEs. For s, t ∈ [0, T ], we have
Λ1(s, t) = b(t), Λk+1(s, t) = b(t)
(∫ s
t
b(r)dr
)k
, P (s, t) = b(t)e
∫
s
t
b(u)du.
Therefore,
ϕ̂(t) = x(0)e
∫
t
0
b(r)dr, σ̂i(t) =
∫ t
0
σ(s)e
∫
t
s
b(r)drdWi(s),
ĉ(s, t) = c(t)e
∫
s
t
b(r)dr, M(t, s) =
∫ s∧t
0
|c(r)|2e
∫
t
r
b(v)dv+
∫
s
r
b(v)dvdr.
The NCE equation in this setting takes the following rather simple form
â(t) = ϕ̂(t) +
1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
|c(r)|2e
∫
t
r
b(v)dv+
∫
s
r
b(v)dvdr · {γâ(s) + η − â(s)}ds. (55)
Theorem 4.1 Suppose that b, c are bounded functions such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
[
(γ − 1)
∫ s∧t
0
|c(r)|2e
∫
t
r
b(v)dv+
∫
s
r
b(v)dvdr
]2
ds < R.
Then NCE equation (55) admits a continuous solution.
We define by
ûi(t) = − 1
R
c(t)EFt
∫ T
t
e
∫
s
t
b(r)dr [xi(s)− γâ(s)− η]ds, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (56)
where â is the solution of NCE equation and
xi(t) = x(0)e
∫
t
0
b(r)dr +
∫ t
0
σ(s)e
∫
t
s
b(r)drdWi(s)
− 1
R
∫ t
0
|c(s)|2EFs
∫ T
s
e
∫
r
s
b(v)dv+
∫
t
s
b(r)dr[xi(r)− γâ(r)− η]drds, (57)
then we get the following asymptotic equilibrium analysis in present setting.
Theorem 4.2 Suppose b, c and σ are bounded and deterministic, the NCE equation admits a
solution â ∈ C[0, T ]. Moreover,
T
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
|c(r)|4e2
∫
t
r
b(v)dv+2
∫
s
r
b(v)dvdrdsdt <
R2
3
.
Then the set of controls defined in (56) for N players is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Remark 4.1 One can express ûi in (56) as ûi(t) =
1
R
c(t)[−P ′(t)xi(t) + δ(t)] where P ′ and δ
satisfy Riccati equation and backward ordinary differential equation respectively, see for example,
[8], [11] and [20]. Such procedure is different from ours here. More precise, it makes use the
advantage of state equation and optimal control (note that s and t are separable). However, such
skills are hard to be applied in more general model such as the state equations with delay below.
In such sense, our approach applied here is more flexiable which can fill this technical gap.
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4.2 SDEs with delay in the state process
In this case, suppose cost functional is (4) and the state equation is described by
dxi(t) =
[
A(t)xi(t− h) +
∫ t
t−h
B(t, s)xi(s)ds
]
dt+ C(t)ui(t)dt+D(t)dWi(t), (58)
where h > 0, xi(t) = k(t), t ∈ [−h, 0], k(t) is bounded. Hence the delay term appears in the
state process. By introducing function Φ1 as

∂Φ1(t, s)
∂t
= A(t)Φ1(t− h, s) +
∫ t
t−h
B(t, r)Φ1(r, s)dr, t ≥ 0,
Φ1(0, 0) = 1, Φ1(t, s) = 0, t < 0,
(59)
we transform (58) into (see [18], [21])
xi(t) = ψ(t) +
∫ t
0
K(t, s)ui(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Φ1(t, s)D(s)dWi(s), (60)
where K(t, s) = Φ1(t, s)C(s), and
ψ(t) = Φ1(t, 0)k(0) +
∫ 0
−h
[
Φ1(t, s+ h)A(s + h) +
∫ h
0
Φ1(t, u)B(u, s)du
]
k(s)ds.
It follows that the above Φ1 is bounded and continuous in t. On the other hand, (60) is one
special case of Equation (3) by letting b = 0, hence for t, s ∈ [0, T ],
P (t, s) = 0, ĉ(s, t) = Φ1(t, s)C(s),
ϕ̂(t) = ψ(t), σ̂i(t) =
∫ t
0
Φ1(t, s)D(s)dWi(s),
M(t, s) =
∫ s∧t
0
Φ1(t, r)Φ1(s, r)|C(r)|2dr.
The NCE equation in this situation becomes
â(t) = ψ(t) +
1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
Φ1(t, r)Φ(s, r)|C(r)|2dr ·
{
γâ(s) + η − â(s)}ds. (61)
Theorem 4.3 Suppose A, B, C are bounded deterministic functions such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
[
(γ − 1)
∫ s∧t
0
Φ1(t, r)Φ1(s, r)|C(r)|2dr
]2
ds < R,
where Φ1 is defined by (59), then NCE equation (61) admits a continuous solution.
Given â being a solution of NCE equation, if we define
ûi(t) = − 1
R
C(t)EFt
∫ T
t
Φ1(s, t)[xi(s)− γâ(s)− η]ds, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (62)
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where
xi(t) = ψ(t) +
∫ t
0
Φ1(t, s)D(s)dWi(s)
−R−1
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
Φ1(t, r)Φ1(s, r)|C(r)|2EFr [xi(s)− γâ(s)− η]drds,
then we get the following asymptotic equilibrium analysis in such setting.
Theorem 4.4 Suppose that A, B, C and D are bounded deterministic functions, the NCE
equation admits a consistent solution â ∈ C[0, T ]. Moreover,
T
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
|C(r)|4Φ1(t, r)Φ1(s, r)drdsdt < R
2
3
.
Then the set of controls defined in (62) for N players is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
4.3 SDEs with delay in the control
In this case, suppose the cost functional is (4) and the state equation is described by
dxi(t) = A(t)xi(t)dt+ C(t)ui(t− h)dt +D(t)dWi(t), (63)
where h > 0, xi(t) = k(t), t ∈ [−h, 0], C(t) = 0 with t < h. The delayed term appears in the
control variable. Similarly, by introducing function Φ2 as
∂Φ2(t, s)
∂t
= A(t)Φ2(t, s) Φ2(s, s) = 1, t, s ∈ [0, T ], (64)
we can transform equation (63) into
xi(t) = ψ(t) +
∫ t
0
K(t, s)ui(s)ds+
∫ t
0
Φ2(t, s)D(s)dWi(s), (65)
where
ψ(t) = Φ2(t, 0)k(0), K(t, s) = Φ2(t, s+ h)C(s + h), t, s ∈ [0, T ].
Therefore, (65) is one special case of (3) with b = 0, and
P (t, s) = 0, ĉ(s, t) = Φ2(s, t+ h)C(t+ h),
ϕ̂(t) = Φ2(t, 0)k(0), σ̂i(t) =
∫ t
0
Φ2(t, s)D(s)dWi(s),
M(t, s) =
∫ s∧t
0
Φ2(t, r + h)Φ2(s, r + h)|C(r + h)|2dr.
The NCE equation in this situation becomes
â(t) = ψ(t) +
1
R
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
Φ2(t, r + h)Φ2(s, r + h)|C(r + h)|2dr ·
{
γâ(s) + η − â(s)}ds. (66)
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Theorem 4.5 Suppose A, C and D are bounded functions such that
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∫ T
0
[
(γ − 1)
∫ s∧t
0
Φ2(t, r + h)Φ2(s, r + h)|C(r + h)|2dr
]2
ds < R,
then NCE equation (66) admits a unique solution.
Given â being the NCE solution, we define
ûi(t) = − 1
R
C(t+ h)EFt
∫ T
t
Φ2(s, t+ h)[xi(s)− γâ(s)− η]ds, t ∈ [0, T ], (67)
while xi satisfies
xi(t) = Φ2(t, 0)k(0) +
∫ t
0
Φ2(t, s)D(s)dWi(s)
−R−1
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
Φ2(t, r + h)Φ2(s, r + h)|C(r + h)|2EFr [xi(s)− γâ(s)− η]drds,
then we get the following asymptotic equilibrium analysis,
Theorem 4.6 Suppose that b and c are bounded, the NCE equation (23) admits a unique con-
tinuous solution â ∈ C[0, T ]. Moreover,
T
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
∫ s∧t
0
|C(r + h)|4Φ2(t, r + h)Φ2(s, r + h)drdsdt < R
2
3
,
where Φ2 is defined in (64). Then the set of controls defined in (67) for N players is an ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.
5 Concluding remark
Herein, we investigate a class of mean-field LQG games where state equation is some stochastic
Volterra integral system. The NCE consistency condition is derived based on some Fredholm
equations and the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of decentralized controls is also established. Our
work is the first attempt to the LQG games with stochastic integral system and there arise
various research directions upon it. On one hand, it is possible to include the Volterra integral
kernel into the cost functional to be minimized. This provides some potential way to study the
LQG game with time inconsistency. On the other hand, this paper also considers the mean-field
games with stochastic delayed system. Actually, more extensive research can be given in this
research line and it is anticipated some new consistency conditions can be given which depend
on the delay characters.
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